Events

• Video

• Contact Us
• |
• Search our Site

 

ASIALINK -August 13th, 1999

In the century long history of the Australian federation and the associated evolution of an independent Australian foreign and defence policy, our regional strategic environment over the last quarter century has probably never been more benign. Ê

Since the fall of Saigon in 1975, with the exception of the Sino-Vietnamese border war, Vietnamâs occupation of Cambodia and the ensuing civil war in Cambodia itself, neither East Asia nor the West Pacific has seen large scale military conflict. Ê

This absence of military conflict has in no way small way contributed to the regionâs golden age of economic growth ö one which only came to its conclusion (hopefully a temporary one) with the regional financial crisis of July 1997. Ê

We cannot overstate the extent to which strategic stability and security have underpinned more than two decades of regional prosperity ö a prosperity from which this country has in no small part benefited. Ê

There is, however, a temptation with the passage of years to believe that it will always be thus.Ê And for those too young to remember anything else, that it may always have been thus ö that this is the permanent and natural order of things. Ê

The truth, of course, is that for this region, it is neither the norm nor the aberration.Ê Ê

Certainly if we look to the past, to the period prior to 1975, the region offers a litany of large scale civil war, wars of national liberation as well as the general conflagration that was World War II. Ê

And when we turn to the future, informed by this history and shaped in part by a number of the problems left over from history, we need also to be circumspect. Ê

Because I believe there is nothing intrinsically permanent about the peace, stability, and security that has characterised our region in the recent past.Ê These are things that have been earned and which must continue to be earned. Ê

If we expand our scope and include South Asia as well, the greater region of which we are part is host to more than half of the worldâs seven major unresolved territorial conflicts ö Timor, Kashmir, Taiwan, the South China Sea and Korea within the region;Ê the Persian Gulf, Palestine and the Balkans beyond it. Ê

Furthermore, three of these four unresolved regional conflicts involve nation states already in possession of weapons of mass destruction. Ê

Indonesia and East Timor constitute the exception and it is to be hoped by all that the UN sponsored ballot scheduled for 30 August resolves this issue peacefully once and for all.Ê For if it does not, it will present profound foreign policy and strategic policy dilemmas for Australia well into the future. Ê

In Kashmir, a long standing conflict has been rendered more dangerous by the recent detonation of Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices. Ê

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea also remain although regional processes have assisted in ameliorating some of the more acute tensions of the past. Ê

On the Korean Peninsular, the prospect of war waxes and wanes depending upon the state of domestic political instability within the DPRK and its perceived external security threats at any given time.Ê The North also is believed to be in possession of a quantity of weapons grade plutonium.Ê I spoke on this topic in Sydney last week.Ê Ê

However, the grand-daddy of them all is still the unresolved conflict across the Taiwan Straits.Ê Ê

Together with the Korean Peninsular, the Taiwan Straits represents the two largest potential sources of strategic instability in East Asia and the Western Pacific.Ê Ê

There are, in fact, some fundamental similarities between the two. Ê

Like the China-Taiwan dispute, that on the Korean Peninsular is now nearly half a century old. Ê

As in China-Taiwan, the unresolved conflict between the two Koreas also had its origins in ideology, containment, and the Cold War. Ê

In both cases, bloody civil wars were fought ö in Chinaâs case in the absence of the direct participation of the super powers.Ê In the case of the Koreas, the reverse. Ê

It is in fact remarkable that 50 years after the formal cessation of hostilities, the region is still dealing with the unresolved consequences of the Chinese and Korean civil wars.Ê Ê

Our focus today, however, is China and its failed attempt to date to reconcile itself to its so-called renegade province of Taiwan.Ê Ê

Somewhere in a seaside villa, not all that far from the Chinese coastal village of Beidaihe, the CCP leadership will this week be sitting down to what is usually described in the local political vernacular as a ãwork meetingä. Ê

In fact, Beidaihe in the summer becomes Beijing by the sea. Ê

In a tradition that is almost as old as the Peopleâs Republic itself, virtually everybody who is anybody in the Chinese political elite decamps to what was once part of the old German Concession ö to take the waters, escape the heat and to engage in some genuinely heavy-duty politicking. If you are serious about a career in Chinese politics, Beidaihe in August is definitely the place to be seen. Ê

The agenda generally covers the range of major economic and social policy questions of the day ö Chinaâs response to the regional financial crisis, the pace and direction of economic reform, how best to deal with the social casualties of that reform program, as well as hardy perennials such as ãthe problem of the United Statesä. Ê This year, however, the agenda is different. Ê

And the single, galvanising reason it is different is Taiwan ö in particular how to deal with Taiwanese President Lee Teng-huiâs decision last month to throw the cat totally among the pigeons by formally declaring that Beijing and Taipei should now deal with each other on the basis of a ãspecial state to state relationshipä. Ê

Make no mistake. This is probably the most serious development in cross straits relations since 1949 ö including the Taiwan Straits missile crisis of 1995/6 which saw the deployment of two US aircraft carriers to the seas off Taiwan. Ê

The issue then was Lee Teng-huiâs ãunofficialä visit to the United States to collect an honorary doctorate from Stanford. Ê The issue now is of a different order of magnitude altogether and goes to the heart of future Taiwanese adherence to a ãOne China Policyä. Ê

Up until now, the prevailing orthodoxy in the complex theology of the post Î49 relationship between Beijing and Taipei has been that the two sides represent separate political systems within a single state entity ö that single entity being called in Beijingâs case the Peopleâs Republic of China, in Taipeiâs case, the Republic of China. Ê

While no-one seriously doubts that Taiwan exhibits all the practical functionality of an independent state, the over-riding political reality, both between Beijing and Taipei and between Beijing and the 161 nation states with whom it has diplomatic relations, is that the island of Taiwan is a part of China. Ê

To those of us on the outside, all this may seem little more thanÊ medieval semantics. But this is not how it is seen in Beijing where the unity of the motherlandÊ remains a core national and, for that matter, emotional objective. Ê

There is a temptation for those who have witnessed the modernisation of China over the last quarter century to believe that re-unification with Taiwan is no longer taken seriously ö that while the Beijing government may make all manner of public pronouncements about the importance of reunification, that in an age of real-politic and global economic integration, that this is done primarily for form.Ê This is a fundamental misreading of the Chinese political psyche.

In Chinese history, the heroes have always been the ones who have united the Empire while the villains are those who allowed the Empire to disintegrate. Jiang Zemin, Chinaâs President, wants to be a hero. Thatâs why the central taskÊ set for the country after the return of Hong Kong to the warm embrace of the motherland in 1997 and Macao in 1999 is the return of Taiwan. Hong Kong and Macao are Deng Xiaopingâs legacy, Jiang wants Taiwan to be his. Ê

But rather than bringing Taiwan back into the fold, Lee Teng-huiâsÊ declaration of the ninth of July has effectively taken Taiwan further in the reverse direction than it has ever been before. Ê

For the Chinese leadership, this also represents an enormous loss of face.Ê There is an emerging sentiment that the Taiwanese have been disrespectful and in the contemporary traditions of international confucian morality "need to be taught a lesson".Ê Ê

Moreover, for the leadership, the internal dynamics of the Chinese political process demand that China respond because nobody can afford to be seen to be going soft on Taiwan unless you are looking for early political retirement.Ê Itâs a bit like Australiaâs state politicians not wanting to be seen to be soft on crime. Ê

Beijing has already said that Leeâs statement means that ãthe basis of contacts, exchanges and dialogue (between the two sides) has ceased to existä.Ê This is not exactly a positive omen for this Octoberâs scheduled visit to Taiwan by the PRCâsÊ senior negotiator on Taiwan affairs, the octogenarianÊ Wang Daohan, actually proceeding.Ê Ê

There has also been an almost audible increase in the level of sabre rattling across the straits as both sides conduct an unprecedented number of air sorties along their territorial demarcation line above the Taiwan Straits ö President Lee confirming only last week thatÊ two PRC fighter jets had strayed into Taiwanese airspace. The prospect of conflict through miscalculation is not insubstantial. Ê

All this, however, may well be the calm before the storm.Ê Other actions may ensue ö although their timing may spreadÊ into next year, depending in part on further developments in Taiwan and the United States. Ê

There are probably a number of factors at work on the PRC leadership in terms of the timing and intensity of their response to the Taiwanese initiative.Ê Some argue that the upcoming 50th anniversary of the establishment of the PRC on 1 October does not provide the central leadership with the best occasion on which to let loose on their cousins across the Taiwan Straits.Ê After all, this is to be an occasion on which the PRC broadcasts to the world the countryâs not insubstantial economic achievements, particularly since Deng Xiopingâs economic reform program in the late 1970s. Ê

Another factor playing on the leadershipâs mind is the upcoming APECâs Leaders Meeting in Auckland in mid-September.Ê It is likely that Jiang will have a meeting with Clinton.Ê It is highly unlikely that Jiang will want to place himself in a position of having to deal with Clinton and a range of other APEC leaders in the midst of a Taiwan Straits crisis.Ê Furthermore, China is also interested in using the APEC meeting to provide both the occasion and the leverage finally to obtain United States support for Chinaâs accession to the WTO.Ê Ê

As for the menu of possible responses to the Lee Teng-hui initiative, a recent US Report categorised them (in ascending order) as follows: Ê áÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ

first, maximise leverage against Taiwan in all international forums (including APEC ö where it is indeed possible the PRC may in Auckland begin to articulate opposition to the level and form of Taiwanese representation);Ê

áÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ second, measures relating to Taiwanese investments in the PRC (although this has considerable collateral damage to PRC economic interests given the likely impact of such measures on general foreign investor confidence; áÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ

third, political and military provocation (including military and naval exercises) with the object of maximising pressure on the Taiwan stock exchange and on the New Taiwan Dollar ö which the Taiwanese Government will then need to defend at real financial cost to itself; áÊÊÊÊ

fourth, live missile firings along the lines used in 1995/96 áÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ

fifth, partial or complete naval blockade of the island; áÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ

sixth, selected missile attacks on military targets on the island; áÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ

seventh, full-scale territorial invasion.Ê Ê

Naturally, this represents the full range of graduated options from which the PRC leadership can choose ö depending on how they wish to calibrate their response both to the 9 July declaration as well as any subsequent political developments in Taiwan itself, leading up to and including the outcome of the March presidential election.Ê The Chinese are particularly mindful of how their military reaction in 1995/96 missile crisis in fact resulted in a reinforcement in popular support for the then KMT candidate for the presidency Lee Teng-hui.Ê They may not be terribly disposed towards repeating the same mistake ö which means not that they will not react at all, but that a more substantial reaction may in fact await the outcome of the election.Ê Ê

As for Chinese military capacity to give effect to the range of options described above, professional analysts vary in their opinion.Ê The more sceptical among them describe any territorial invasion of the island of Taiwan as ãthe million manâs swimä.Ê They see it as an enormously strategically difficult task ö although not, in the end, beyond the PRCâs conventional capabilities.Ê Ê

The same analysts, however, point to Chinaâs missile forces (both the old generation DF4 missile as well as the newer generation DF31 missile to be deployed from the year 2000) as constituting a much more formidable force projection capability.Ê Such analysts argue that the deployment of these forces (or the threat to deploy these forces) may provide the PRC with the political leverage necessary to realise its objectives with its renegade province.Ê Ê

The view from Taipei, of course, is somewhat different. Ê

While itâs difficult to know exactly why Lee Teng-hui said what he didÊ - and why he chose to say it now ö the bottom line is that it was no accident. Both Lee and Taiwanâs senior negotiator with the Mainland, Koo Chen-foo, have subsequently reiterated the ãstate to state relationsä doctrine and defended it. Ê

Lee is now in the last nine months of his presidency and, like Jiang Zemin, is also mindful of his own political legacy. Those close to Lee claim that he finally just got fed up with Taiwan being completely boxed in by the highly effective international diplomacy of the PRC. Lee was reportedly tired of being treated like a provincial political pariah (both by Beijing and the rest of the world) and concluded that it was timeÊ fundamentally to re-engineer the governing paradigm of cross strait relationsÊ - and to do so, despite the risks, in a manner that actually forces the issue of Taiwan being treated as an equal. Ê

Taiwanese domestic politics has also played a substantial role. There are three candidates for the Presidential elections due next March: the KMTâsÊ Lian Chan (Leeâs current deputy); James Soong, running as an independent but with a long history in the KMT; and the pro-independence Democratic Progress Party candidate and former mayor of Taipei, Chen Shui-pien. Ê

Leeâs policy shift on ãOne Chinaä( which, according to the opinion polls has about 70% popular support) should have the net political effect of boosting the election prospects of the non charismatic Lian against both his adversaries ö against Soong because he is known to be much more cautious on the Mainland relations question; against Chen because Leeâs stand cuts much of Chenâs support base from under him. Ê

At the end of the day, Lee maintains, at least for the public record, that his most recent formulation does not represent a significant policy shift.Ê His justification is that while he is now talking about ãstate-to-stateä relations, he simultaneously maintains that he has not ruled out the possibility of long term reunification with the mainland ö if and when the mainland manages to transform itself into an effective political democracy and a market economy.Ê In the meantime, so Lee Teng-Huiâs doctrine runs he is prepared for Taiwan to engage in negotiations about various forms of practical cooperation ö eg. navigation, narcotics and smuggling.Ê Ê

Leeâs advisers go on to suggest that his 9 July formulation now for the first time provides a proper basis for Taiwan to discuss ãpoliticalä matters with the PRC ö something that Taiwan has steadfastly refused to do in the past.Ê Presumably Leeâs logic is that if the PRC are prepared to cop the new ãstate-to-state relationsä formula, then Lee is prepared to offer a quid pro quo of discussing with them the future political architecture of a unified China.Ê

Of course, all this gives the lie to the proposition that the 9 July pronouncement does not represent new policy.Ê If it didnât represent new policy, itâs difficult to imagine why Lee would use this new formulation as a justification for commencing negotiations on aspects of the cross straits relationship hitherto ruled out of bounds.Ê Ê

Of course, the possibility of the PRC transforming itself into a political democracy in the immediate future is somewhat remote ö thus effectively enabling Lee to put any substantive negotiations on future political unity off into the ãnever neverä.Ê When I sat down with The Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) in Beijing a couple of months ago, certainly the view conveyed to me then was that the Taiwanese were deliberately using formulations designed to play for time ö in effect to almost permanently postpone any substantial negotiations with Beijing.ÊÊ ARATS view at the time (and remember this was nearly two months before Lee Teng-Huiâs statement) was that the entire Taiwanese negotiating strategy with the PRC was based on an elaborate set of stalling tactics.Ê In the words of one of their representatives, it did not represent ãa genuine intention to negotiateä.Ê Ê

Of course the view in Taipei was somewhat different to that when in February this year I spoke with ARATS counterpart body in Taipei, the Straits Exchange Federation (SEF), their view was that they doubted Beijingâs sincerity because Beijing had refused to countenance substantial progress in practical areas of cooperation such as narcotics and smuggling.Ê They were certainly of the view that Beijing was simply interested in steamrollering them into political negotiations at the first opportunity (based on the one country two systems model used in Hong Kong) but without having built first a fabric and framework of mutual trust and respect.Ê This was also the view put to me by Taiwanese Prime Minister Vincent Siew whom I also met during that visit.Ê Ê

Whatever happens to be Taiwanâs diplomatic strategy, however, a final word needs to be said about Taiwanâs military capacity - both in terms of its capacity to afford Taiwanâs diplomacy some genuine leverage as well as, more basically, Taiwanâs capacity independently to defend itself. Ê

Recent commentary within Taiwan itself has pointed to a heightened degree of military vulnerability to a PRC security threat.Ê There is a widening disparity between the two regimes defence budgets ö Taiwanese annual defence outlays totalling about $US11 billion as against $US30 billion (conservatively) in the PRC.Ê The Taiwanese armed forces are, in fact, suffering from Taiwanâs successful economic development and that, unlike a generation ago, the military represents a lousy career if you want to make a dollar ö as most young Taiwanese want to do.Ê There are real problems in attracting and retaining high quality recruits given the enormous disparities in the salary structures between the armed forces on the one hand and the business community on the other.Ê Ê Of course the other pressure being felt on the defence expenditure front is in the area of capital acquisitions ö in particular how to counter the modernisation and proliferation of PRC missile deployments across the Taiwan Straits in neighbouring Fujian Province. Ê In fact there is a view on Taiwan that the military gap between the island and the mainland is only likely to get wider in the future ö which means that there may only be a limited window of opportunity within which to launch a significant and successful diplomatic initiative to secure Taiwanâs political future. ÊSome analysts suggest this may have formed part of Lee Teng-Huiâs thinking when he made his ãstate to stateä pronouncement on 9 July.Ê

Ê Of course if you are Taiwanese, a number of these alternatives appear to be fairly stark:Ê either lift defence outlays (at the expense of the civilian economy);Ê play for time and hope that the PRC does in fact democratise and loses its desire, as a consequence, to forcefully reunite Taiwan with the mainland;Ê or third, place most of your hopes in the continued support of the United States ö come hell or high water.Ê Of course, if you are sitting in Taipei, you canât have any confidence about the second or the third of these alternatives.Ê Hence Lee Teng-Huiâs initiative. Ê

The final element in the strategic triangle is the United States.- which has not in recent months had the most fortuitous of relationships with the PRC. Ê

Starting with Premier Zhu Rongjiâs disastrous visit to Washington in April ( from which he returned empty-handed on Chinaâs accession to the WTO); Chinese hostility to ongoing US Theatre Missile Defence discussions with Japan, the ROK and Taiwan; the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May; the Cox Report on alleged Chinese espionage activities in connection with US nuclear technologies; as well as the continuing over-hang of ãCampaign-gateäand alleged Chinese contributions to the Democratic National Committee; has all made for a fairly interesting periodÊ in Sino-US relations this year. In fact, the relationship probably has not been worse. Ê

All of which makes for a somewhat problematic environment for the effective management of what could well turn into a genuine crisis across the Taiwan Straits by yearâs end. Ê

Fortunately President Clinton acted promptly and decisively after Leeâs 9 July statement and telephoned Jiang Zemin to advise him that the United States ãOne China Policyä had not changed. We are, however, only at the beginning of this crisis and the Clinton Administration, like its predecessors, will need to contend with the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act which commits the US to ãresist any resort to force· that would jeopardise the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwanä. Ê

Itâs worth remembering that it was several months after Lee Teng Huiâs visit to Stanford in 1995 that the PRC began its retaliatory campaign of live missile firings just off Taiwan. Ê

Which of course makes this monthâs deliberations at Beidaihe, as well asÊ the next six months of Taiwanese presidential election politics, important for us all.